[Update] Listen to the Forum broadcast here >>

Please check each link for specifics about each event.

July 15

KQED San Francisco
Forum – 10:00-10:30

World Affairs Council, San Francisco
6:30-7:30

July 22

The Hudson Institute, Washington DC
12:00-2:00

The World Affairs Council, Washington DC
6:30-8:00

Timothy Lynch

Robert Singh

Don’t Expect a Big Change in U.S. Foreign Policy

Want more George W. Bush foreign policy? Elect John McCain – or Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama. Regardless of who wins in November, the current foreign policy will live on in the next White House.

None of the main candidates has disavowed the war on terror. Each has called Mr. Bush tactically deficient. But the debate over the war on terror is over how, where and when. The candidates have all argued that they would do a better job of fighting it.

Administrations bequeath foreign policies to their successors that are then tweaked, but rarely transformed. The seeds of Ronald Reagan’s Cold War strategy were sown in the defense buildup of the later Jimmy Carter years. President Bush’s purported “obsession” with Baghdad began in the hawkish statecraft of Vice President Al Gore. In 1998, Bill Clinton made regime change official U.S. policy, and in 2003 Mr. Bush made it a reality.

The last great liberal hope to win the White House – Bill Clinton – committed more troops to more parts of the globe than any president since World War II. Since the end of the Cold War, America has undertaken at least nine military interventions overseas, under three presidents of both parties in two distinct historical eras (pre- and post-9/11). This history suggests that the next great liberal hope – Mr. Obama or Mrs. Clinton – would probably continue the trend.

Furthermore, the departure of Mr. Bush will hardly leave the nation’s foreign relationships in tatters. Despite much American introspection, Euro-liberal sniping and Latin American leftist fantasizing, the quantity and quality of America’s formal friendships have endured, if not actually increased, since 2001. Eighty-four governments, out of a world total of some 192, are formally allied with the U.S.

Foreign leaders such as France’s Nicolas Sarkozy and Germany’s Angela Merkel clearly see that their true interest resides in maintaining and renewing their relationships with the U.S. Few governments have prospered by severing such bonds. In Asia as well, nations are looking to strengthen their ties to America. China needs the U.S. market. India is moving toward America, not away.

The number of America’s foes hasn’t grown under the Bush administration. The actual number of our enemies can be counted on one hand: Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela. With the exception of the latter, all these enmities predate Mr. Bush and his successor will inherit them.

Certain aspects of anti-Americanism are essentially immune to what any president does. The U.S. can bomb Christians to protect Muslims, as it did in Bosnia in 1994-1995 and Serbia in 1999, and still somehow augment the fury of radical Islamists.

It’s also important to remember that we’re winning the war in Iraq. A President Obama would risk too much with a precipitous withdrawal, especially if it was just to fulfill an early campaign pledge that was adopted more to establish blue water between him and Mrs. Clinton than to reformulate the war on terror. Mr. Obama’s opposition to the Iraq war is empirical – “it didn’t work” – rather than ideological.

Mr. Obama is capable of changing his position to reflect events on the ground. He is not dedicated to a peacenik vision of immediate withdrawal. He will not desert Iraq if doing so puts U.S. national security at risk.

The desire to get rid of George W. Bush will not make his replacement any less vociferous and committed to the current president’s pursuit of American prosperity and security. As such, rising expectations in and outside America for rapid foreign-policy transformation are likely to lead to disappointment. As a Romanian proverb reminds us: “A change of leaders is the joy of fools.”

Messrs. Lynch and Singh, academics at the University of London, are the authors of After Bush: The Case for Continuity in American Foreign Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

Timothy Lynch and Robert Singh

The parallels between the ongoing US actions in Iraq since 2003 and US actions in Korea after 1950 were especially apparent at the Senate hearings on Tuesday. In both wars a charismatic general held the attention of the nation and the fate of his president. Indeed, of his future president too. The most important military official serving George W. Bush is Dan Petraeus. Ditto Harry S. Truman and Douglas MacArthur. Each general brought stunning success that was profoundly controversial back home. The wars they waged caused the popularity of their respective commander-in-chief to plummet. Importantly, their wars were not short, sharp, shocks. They entailed a massive military and economic subvention by the United States – at the request of the host government. America has ‘occupied’ South Korea since 1950; its troops are still there. Iraq, we were warned again yesterday, could be at least as long.

For those with sufficient patience, the legacy of Korea for Iraq is a positive one, as is the legacy of the cold war for the war on terror. If America can stand by its allies over the long haul, in a dangerous neighbourhood, in a global war against a diffuse but ideologically committed opponent it will succeed in this venture.

Korea was the first major battle of a much larger war in which the United States ultimately triumphed. It was controversial, ambiguous, scarred by incompetence – political and military – and meant Truman left the White House a defeated and dejected figure. The parallels with Bush hardly need oblique reference. But the strategy began in Korea worked. It turned South Korea into a model market democracy (especially when set against the fate of its northern neighbour) and, with hindsight, represented a central pillar of US cold war strategy.

Iraq is likely to be remembered in similar fashion, even if Bush won’t go down in history as a Truman. It is the opening battle of a much longer war. The consequences of a precipitate withdrawal, as Petraeus warned yesterday and throughout his commission, would be tantamount to ending the cold war early because particular battles within it went badly. America would present itself as a paper tiger. Hurt it badly enough, said Mao, and it will retreat. This was the logic of international communism. It remains strikingly similar to the strategic thinking of jihadists in the current war: if we hurt the Americans, or if we just wait for them to lose patience and resolve, they will run away.

Finally, consider a second analogy. In 1939, Great Britain went to war over Poland. The liberation of that nation from socialism (German national and then Soviet) was not secured for another fifty years. British ‘failure’ to rescue Poland quickly did not invalidate the strategic, let alone moral, imperatives of World War Two. US failure to secure Iraq quickly should be seen in the same light. Playing the long game might not appeal to politicians and a media that demand instance results. Grand strategies, however, require them.

Timothy Lynch is Lecturer in US Foreign Policy, Institute for the Study of the Americas, University of London.

Robert Singh is Professor of Politics, Birbeck College, University of London.

They are authors of After Bush: a Case for Continuity in American Foreign Policy

Our own Sadhika Salariya has been working with a couple of authors who have their own ideas about what the next president will bring.

“As commander-in-chief, I will always reserve the right to make sure that we are looking out for American interests. And if Al Qaeda is forming a base in Iraq, then we will have to act in a way that secures the American homeland and our interests abroad”.

-Senator Obama to Tim Russert of NBC News, February 2008

Ok! So the buzz is on, America’s excited, Obama and Hillary are head to head, and with McCain, all promise to reinvigorate the economy at home. Race, Immigration, Tax cuts, Health Care have all been central to the Presidential elections campaigning. However, amongst this entire bustle, it is very important to take a moment and reflect back. Are we moving away from something? Are there any loose ends emerging?

We all know George W. Bush’s exit is awaited; there is no question about it. We all have witnessed the enthusiasm on all sides. But remember: today is the Fifth Anniversary of the Invasion in Iraq. The war has been one of the key decisions in American political history that has won few admirers, with pundits and politicians eagerly bashing the tenets of the Bush Doctrine. This war exacerbated our Bush’s unpopularity towards the end of his second presidential term.

How much do you remember about how this war has unfolded?

It often comes to mind: why has foreign policy and Iraq diminished to become a yes-or-no issue?

Obama and Hillary have talked about “change” and “unity” vaguely every now and then, and America has been listening – patiently thus far. However, slowly it also seems that the democratic attitudes and positions on war are changing. Are they really the “change agents” they claim to be? Should Americans brace themselves for a different kind of reality? The troops’ homecoming, a hope for a return to an America that addresses the world in softer tones and disavows precipitate military action; do these expectations still seem realistic? Most importantly, is America going to experience “change”, the most popular slogan factored into every political campaign and speech?

Timothy J. Lynch and Robert S. Singh think these expectations might disappoint many. They delve into the past and present on foreign policy and dare to counter the dogma of Bush’s beltway detractors and his ideological enemies, boldly arguing that Bush’s policy deservedly belongs with the mainstream of the American foreign policy traditions. Lynch and Singh present a daring audit on the war on terror, which they contend should be understood as a Second Cold War- and charge that the Bush doctrine has been consistent with past foreign policies- from Republican and Democratic Presidencies. They predict the key elements of George Bush’s grand strategy will rightly continue to shape America’s approach in the future.

After Bush: The Case for Continuity in American Foreign Policy is a provocative account that weighs in on controversial and crucial topics about Islamist Terrorism, American National Security, Iraq and the Middle East.

Check back for more from the authors election analysis!